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INTERNATIONAL BOUNTYHUNTING: A QUESTION OF
STATE RESPONSIBILITY
In May, 1981, Sidney Jaffe was "kidnapped" by two American
bountyhunters near his home in Toronto, Canada.1 The state of Flor-
ida had been prosecuting Jaffe for faudulent land sales. While free on
bail Jaffe fled to Canada. Florida instituted extradition proceedings
which were ineffective due to the state's failure to follow proper pro-
cedure.2 Impatient prosecutors encouraged Jaffe's bondsman to ab-
duct the fugitive and return him to Florida to stand trial.3
The Canadian government protested the abduction claiming
that it violated international law.4 Canada based its protest on the
United States-Canadian extradition treaty,5 maintaining that the
mere existence of the agreement prohibited abduction as a means of
recapturing alleged criminals.6
Transnational abductions are not uncommon.7 Such seizures
raise serious questions of legality under international law. Abduction
violates international law if a State is deemed responsible for the ab-
duction.8 State liability will attach if there is a sufficient connection
between the State and the perpetrators of the abduction.9
Presently, the seizure of a person in one State by agents of an-
other is considered a violation of international law.1° The foreign
1. Staff, Putnam County v Canada, TIME, Aug. 8, 1983, at 58. The term "kidnapping"
is used here in the traditional sense. For a fuller discussion see infra note 13 and accompanying
text.
2. Id. The entanglement was caused by Florida's failure to file the proper forms. The
forms which were filed were improperly drawn and rejected by Canada. Szende-Camper, The
Bounty Hunter Mutiny, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 30, 1982, at 58.
3. Szende-Camper, supra note 2.
4. Florida rebuffed these claims and refused to release Jaffe. Staff, supra note 1, at 58.
5. Id.
6. Sidney Jaffe was convicted of land sale violations and spent nineteen months in prison.
He was finally released on October 11, 1983, but still faces another charge. His present free-
dom is the result of the payment of a $150,000 bond. Jaffe has again returned to Canada. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 12, 1983, at A16, col. 1.
7. For some interesting cases dealing with abduction see 4 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 330-35 (1906).
8. W. LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 234
(1979).
9. To find State responsibility the acts must be attributable to the State, through the
actor. See infra text accompanying notes 78-110.
10. Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State Over Fugitives Brought from a Foreign
Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND. L. J. 427 (1957); Cordozo, When
1
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State is responsible in such a case because the abductors are consid-
ered State agents."1 The status of bountyhunters as State agents is
questionable, however, because they are neither employed nor di-
rectly paid by the State. Thus, States generally assert that because
the requisite relationship is lacking between the State and abductors
the latter are not State agents and therefore no State responsibility
should attach. Moreover, States may be held vicariously responsible
for an unauthorized individual whose abductions are encouraged by
the State. 12 If a State is deemed either directly or vicariously respon-
sible for the abduction, sanctions may be invoked through the legal
process.
Bountyhunting on the international level is a form of kidnap-
ping13 as it involves seizures by persons without lawful authority.
Such unlawful seizures pose serious threats to peaceful relations
among States' 4 and must therefore be discouraged.
This Comment will demonstrate that a sufficient relationship ex-
ists between the State and bountyhunter to consider the latter a State
agent.' 5 An overview of the relevent law concerning abduction by
State agents will reveal that such acts are illegal.' 6 The legal argu-
ments for applying these principles to bountyhunters will then be
presented. An analysis of these arguments will demonstrate that the
bountyhunter assumes the role of a State agent and thereby renders
the abducting State directly responsible for his acts. 7 These argu-
ments will also define the manner in which the State encourages ab-
ductions by bountyhunters and thereby incurs vicarious
responsibility. The discussion of direct and vicarious responsibility
will focus primarily on United States law and its system of bail.
However, the theories of responsibility are accepted as international
Extradition Fails is Abduction the Solution?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 127, 132 (1961); Feinrider,
Extra-territorial Abductions: A Newly Developing International Standard, 14 AKR. L. REV. 27,
29 (1980).
11. C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 343 (1965).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 100-10.
13. Kidnapping is defined as the unlawful seizure of a person against his will from one
country to another. State v. Olsen, 76 Utah 81, 289 P. 92,93 (1930). When a bountyhunter
seizes a person in a foreign country he has kidnapped that person. This stems from the fact
that the foreign country gives him no authority to arrest. Thus, he seizes without lawful au-
thority and therefore has kidnapped.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 146-51.
15. " The term "abducting State" refers to the State for whose benefit the person was ab-
ducted. For example, under the facts of the Jaffe incident the United States is considered the
abducting State. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 21-77.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 81-99.
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law and have worldwide application. 8
The policy and practical considerations for declaring
bountyhunting illegal will also be examined. This discussion will de-
tail the dangers bountyhunting poses to world public order. 9 This
Comment proposes to deter and punish international bountyhunting
through the revision of policies which will allow courts to maintain
jurisdiction over an abducted defendant.20 This Comment concludes
by suggesting the creation of a uniform extradition act which will
increase the effectiveness of extradition law and decrease the need for
illegal bountyhunting.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED To ABDUCTIONS BY
STATE AGENTS
International law controlling abductions by State agents is based
on general principles of State sovereignty. These principles are specif-
ically defined by treaties, case law and international custom.
A. Principles of Sovereignty
The abduction of an alleged criminal by agents of a foreign State
is a violation of the asylum State's sovereignty.21 Sovereignty in its
fullest sense involves supreme, absolute and uncontrolled power
22
which extends to all territory within the State's boundaries.23 All
persons24 found within the State's boundaries are subject to the ex-
clusive power of that State,25 and no other State may exert jurisdic-
tion over questions arising within the former's boundaries.26
Moreover, if a question arises concerning the status of a person in the
territory of the asylum State, only that State may exercise in per-
18. Many countries do not have a system of bail that entails the use of bail bondsmen.
Moreover, private parties often take action on behalf of a State similar to the acts of the Ameri-
can bountyhunter. See MOORE, supra note 7, at 330-35. See also infra text accompanying
notes 43-49. Thus, the absence of any particular type of bail system does not prevent the
application of those theories and the bountyhunter may be considered just one application of
the principles contained in this Comment.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 111-50.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 151-61.
21. Feinrider, supra note 10, at 28.
22. 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (1940).
23. H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 317 (1966).
24. An exception to this rule is diplomatic immunity. Under this exception, the diplo-
matic agents of another State are exempt from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the State
where they serve. FENWICK, supra note 11, at 563.
25. KELSEN, supra note 23, at 317.
26. G. DAVIS, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (1916).
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sonam jurisdiction.27 Thus, sovereignty signifies a State's indepen-
dence and right to be free from outside interference.28
Sovereignty also creates a corresponding duty by which every
State must refrain from attempting to exercise its sovereign powers
within the territory of another State.29 This duty, as it relates to the
apprehension of fugitives, forbids one State from sending its agents
into the territory of another State to capture alleged criminals.3 °
When a fugitive escapes into the territory of another country, the
pursuing authorities must stop at the border of the asylum State.3 1
Even police in hot pursuit 32 may not cross an international border
and arrest a fugitive in the territory of another State.3
Coincidental with the general duty to refrain from sending ab-
ductors into foreign countries, an affirmative duty is also imposed on
a State to prevent its nationals from violating the sovereignty of an-
other country.34 This duty places on every State an obligation to
take all steps necessary to prevent abduction in any form.35 These
duties and the principles on which they rely form the theoretical ba-
sis for finding that abduction by State agents violates international
law. Application of these principles is best illustrated by examining
specific law dealing with sovereignty and abduction.
1. Treaty Law. The United States is a party to a number of
treaties dealing with the question of sovereignty. 36 Two of these trea-
ties have been used to condemn abduction by State agents.3 7 The
first of these documents is the United Nations Charter. Under Arti-
cle 2 of this instrument all States must refrain from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity of another State.38 This arti-
27. T. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (1923).
28. DAVIS, supra note 26, at 35.
29. 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (1965).
30. Id.
31. G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 250 (1981).
32. The term "hot pursuit" refers to the situation where authorities are in active or unin-
terrupted pursuit of the accused. B. WESTON, R. FALK & A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND WORLD ORDER 886 (1980).
33. WHITEMAN, supra note 29, at 216.
34. Id. at 7.
35. Private persons are capable of violating sovereignty. See infra text accompanying
notes 111-12. The State's duty to prevent such violations imposes a duty to take affirmative
action to prevent abductions by private persons and State agents.
36. Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948. 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361,
119 U.N.T.S. 3; U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
37. See supra note 36.
38. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. This declares that "all members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
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cle has been interpreted to mean that the signatories are obligated not
to violate the territorial sovereignty of other States.39 It has been
held that in light of the UN Charter the abduction of a person on
foreign soil violates the territorial sovereignty of the asylum State.
Similarly, Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American
States' (OAS) provides that a State's territory is inviolable and may
not be subject to any measure of force by another State.41 This treaty
is also violated when a criminal defendant is abducted by foreign
agents.42
2. Case law. Consistent with the UN and OAS Charters is
case law which also finds abduction by State agents a violation of
sovereignty. The most celebrated case concerning transnational ab-
duction is Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann.43 This case con-
cerned Adolf Eichmann, a nazi war criminal indicted for genocide
committed during World War II." Israeli volunteers who had been
searching for Eichmann since the end of the war45 eventually discov-
ered him living in Argentina.46 Eichmann was abducted and taken
to Israel to stand trial for war crimes.47 As a result of this kidnap-
ping, Argentina requested that the United Nations consider the legal-
ity of Israel's action.4" The Security Council found that the
abduction had violated Argentine sovereignty and was incompatible
with the UN Charter.49
An important United States decision dealing with abduction by
independence of any member or State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of
the United Nations."
39. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
40. Organization of American States, supra note 36.
41. Id. art. 17. The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object of, even
temporarily, military occupation or other measures of force taken by another State. No territo-
rial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or other means of coercion will
be recognized.
42. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 276.
43. Att'y Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 INT'L .L. REP. 5 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961).
44. WHITEMAN, supra note 29, at 208.
45. Id. at 208. The abductors of Eichmann were described as "volunteers" in a letter sent
from the Government of Israel to Argentina. This seemed to indicate that they were not offi-
cial Israeli agents. However, the Security Council did not concern itself with the status of the
abductors. It might be assumed, therefore, that the Security Council would find a violation of





49. Id. at 211.
5
Seaman: International Bountyhunting: A Question of State Responsibility
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
State agents is United States v. Toscanino. ° In this case the defend-
ant had been convicted of conspiracy to import narcotics.5 When
the case reached the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Toscanino
contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because he had been
abducted from Uruguay.-2 Toscanino maintained that United States
officials had participated in his abduction and subsequent torture.
53
The Court of Appeals remanded the case, holding that if the
defendant had been illegally abducted abroad at the direction of
United States agents the lower court should decline to exercise juris-
diction.54 The court reasoned that such an abduction would violate
the territorial sovereignty of Uruguay and therefore the UN and
OAS Charters as well.5" The court further stated that in such an
instance the usual remedy would be release of the abducted
individual.56
These cases support the proposition that abduction by State
agents violates the sovereignty of the asylum State.57 This proposi-
tion is further strengthened under an analysis of principles of cus-
tomary international law.
3. International Custom. Customary international law is com-
prised of two essential elements: "a general practice of States, and
the acceptance by States of this general practice as the Law."5" A
principle will rise to the level of custom when it is generally accepted
. as the law.59 As noted above, modern international law has adopted
the principle that a State has jurisdiction over all persons and things
within its territory.' A corollary to this principle is that no State
may assert its power over persons or things not within its bounda-
50. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 267.
51. Id. at 268.
52. Id. at 276.
53. Id.
54. Lawrence, Criminal Law-Jurisdiction, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 1016 (1975).
55. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 267.
56. Id. at 278.
57. It should be noted that subsequent cases have rejected Toscanino and upheld jurisdic-
tion notwithstanding the abduction of the defendant. See United States ex rel. Lujan v.
Geugler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1975). The Court distinguishished Toscanino, stating the
asylum State's failure to protest the abduction prevented the defendant from asserting interna-
tional law as a defense to the court's jurisdiction. See also United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d
859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974), where the Court distinguishes Toscanino on the grounds that there
was torture and electronic surveilance, factors not present in Herrera.
58. H. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 46 (1972)
(quoting G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1967)).
59. Feinrider, supra note 10, at 37.
60. LAWRENCE, supra note 27, at 199.
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ries.61 Where one State seeks to exercise its jurisdiciton over a fugi-
tive on foreign soil by kidnapping, the abducting State violates
customary international law through a violation of the custom of
sovereignty.62
Analysis of these various forms of international law clearly
reveals that abduction of individuals by agents of a foreign State is a
violation of State sovereignty. Additionally, there are other distinct
principles of law under which transnational abduction is illegal.
B. Extradition Law
The legal procedure used to return fugitives is extradition.63 In
common law countries extradition is usually enforced through a bi-
lateral treaty.' By virtue of such a treaty one sovereign agrees to
surrender an alleged criminal to another State. 5
While extradition treaties generally do not contain provisions
declaring abduction' illegal, there is some support for the theory that
by entering into an extradition treaty all other methods of apprehen-
sion are implicitly prohibited.66 The parties, by entering the treaty,
have decided on an agreed method for the return of alleged criminals.
By this decision the parties have arguably implied that the non-
agreed upon methods will not be used. This view was advocated by a
former United States Secretrary of State,67 who commented that an
extradition treaty with Mexico prohibited both countries from engag-
ing in abduction as a means for the return of fugitives.68
Additional support for this proposition is found in the Vienna
Convention on Treaties. The Convention declares that a State is
obliged to refrain from acts which will defeat the object or purpose of
the treaties it enters. 69 The object and purpose of an extradition
61. These are principles of sovereignty previously discussed. See supra text accompanying
notes 21-35.
62. Feinrider, supra note 10, at 29.
63. Id. at 27. Extradition is that process by which fugitives from justice of one State who
seek asylum in another State are delivered up by the asylum State to the State seeking the
fugitive. 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1942). This process is legal
because it is used pursuant to an agreed upon method embodied in an extradition treaty.
64. M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 7
(1974).
65. Id. at 2.
66. Feinrider, supra note 10, at 29.
67. Letter from Secretary of State Blaine to Mr. Roberts discussing extradition treaties
(1881).
68. MOORE, supra note 7, at 330.
69. I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 15 (1973).
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treaty is an agreed upon method for the apprehension of criminals.70
Abduction defeats this objective because it entails a method that has
not been agreed upon. Abduction, therefore, is a violation of the
State's duties under the extradition treaties to which it is a party.
C. Human Rights
Many countries, including the United States, have recognized
that individuals possess certain rights under international law. One
source of rights relevent to abduction is the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.7" Adopted in 1948 as a General Assembly resolu-
tion,72 this document is not binding as an international convention.7 a
However, increasing authority supports the contention that the Dec-
laration is now binding as customary international law.74
The Declaration contains specific provisions which endow indi-
viduals with the rights to life, liberty, security of person,75 and free-
dom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.76 Abduction involves
the process of securing jurisdiction over a person by unlawful
means. 77 The provisions of the Declaration referring to the rights of
liberty and freedom from arbitrary arrest therefore make abduction
carried out by agents of a foreign State a violation of human rights as
defined by custom.
The doctrine of sovereignty, as well as the law of extradition and
human rights, demonstrate that abductions by agents of a foreign
State is a violation of international law. Therefore, to find a State
responsible for the acts of bountyhunters it must be found that either
the abductors act as State agents or that the State is vicariously liable
for their acts as unauthorized individuals. Such a finding is not
automatic.
70. See supra note 63.
71. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71
(1948) [hereinafter cited as Universal Declaration].
72. BASSIOUNI, supra note 64, at 156.
73. Feinrider, supra note 10, at 39.
74. Id. at 38, 39. The authorities who consider the Declaration international custom in-
clude: international lawyers ("the Declaration is now binding as part of customary law"); the
Official International Conference on Human Rights ("The Declaration constitutes an obliga-
tion for members of the international community"); and the unofficial Montreal Assembly for
Human Rights ("The Declaration has become part of customary international law").
75. Universal Declaration, supra note 71, art. 3.
76. Id. art. 11.
77. WESTON, FALK & D'AMATO, supra note 32, at 482.
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II. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTS OF BOUNTYHUNTERS:
THE LEGAL ARGUMENT
State responsibility is the implied obligation to repair damages
resulting from an act or omission where such act causes injury to
another State.7 s State responsibility is incurred when (1) the individ-
ual responsible for the injury is considered a state agent, or (2) the
injury causing act is authorized by the State.79 States may be vicari-
ously liable for the acts of persons with no official authority where it
is found that the State incites or encourages the wrongful act.80 The
applicability of these theories is illustrated by an examination of the
role of the bountyhunter in the United States bail system.
A. Direct Responsibility: A State Action Analysis
Under State action theory, where a close nexus can be found
between an actor and a State, actions of the individual are considered
those of the State" for which the latter is directly responsible.82
Where the bountyhunter8 3 is concerned, this nexus arises from the
United States bail system, in which a bonding company generally
posts a certain sum of money to guarantee that an accused, who is
released pending adjudication, will return for trial.8 4 This process
takes the form of a contract between the courts and the bondsman
under which the bondsman is given the authority to arrest the ac-
cused 5 and thereby prevent the forfeiture of the bond. 6 To facilitate
this procedure, bondsmen, of necessity, employ bountyhunters.
Upon successful arrest and return of the fugitive these individuals
receive a percentage of the bond.
7
78. 0. SVARLIEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF NATIONS 134 (1955).
79. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1965).
80. SVARLIEN, supra note 78, at 134.
81. Denver Welfare Rights Organization v. Public Utilities Comm., 190 Colo. 329, 547
P.2d 239, 243 (1976).
82. FENWICK, supra note 11, at 355.
83. The term "bondsman", as used in this Comment, is synonomous with bountyhunter.
Bondsman is sometimes used to refer to the entity which posts the bond. Bountyhunters are
hired agents of this entity whose job it is to capture and return persons who have fled from
justice. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. Under a theory of direct responsibility the
acts of the bountyhunter are attributed to the bondsman. The bondsman's acts in turn are
attributed to the State if a requisite relationship is found between the bondsman and the State.
The logical extension of this makes the State directly responsible for the acts of bountyhunters.
84. Hansen, The Professional Bondsman: A State-Action Analysis, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
595, 598 (1981).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 602.
87. Staff, supra note 1, at 58.
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This system of bail forms a contractual relationship between the
State and the bondsman. As a result of this contractual relationship
the statutory authorization to arrest and thereby employ coercive
power of the State vests in the bondsman. 8 Consequently, the
bondsman becomes an arm of the court and performs a service for
the enforcement of criminal law.89 Thus, the bountyhunter becomes
an agent of the State90 whose actions entail its direct responsibility.91
The proposition that bountyhunting constitutes State action is
also supported by the public function theory. Under this theory,
when an unauthorized individual performs acts traditionally and ex-
clusively reserved to the State, those acts are considered State ac-
tion.92 The bondsman exercises the power to arrest, an act which has
traditionally belonged to the State.93 The acts of the bondsman
therefore constitute State action94 since the bondsman is a quasi-judi-
cial officer created by the sovereign.95 Consequently, under this the-
ory the State is directly responsible for the acts of the bondsman.
These theories of State responsibility are also accepted as inter-
national law under the United Nations Draft Articles on State Re-
sponsibility. 96 The Draft provides, in pertinent part:
The conduct of an organ of an entity which is not part of the for-
mal structure of the State but which is empowered by the internal
law of that State to exercise elements of governmental authority
shall also be considered an act of the State under international law
provided the organ was acting in that capacity in the case in
question.
9 7
Although the bountyhunter is not part of the formal structure of
the State, his acts may be considered acts of the State since he is
empowered by internal State law98 to exercise the governmental au-
88. Hansen, supra note 84, at 623.
89. Id.
90. Citizens for Pre-Trial Justice v. Goldfarb, 278 N.W. 2d 653, 658 (Mich. App. 1979).
In this case a person was on bail pending trial. The agents of the surety allegedly arrested, beat
and robbed the individual. The court held that these acts, if proved, could be considered State
action for which a claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, would be cognizable.
91. SVARLIEN, supra note 78, at 134.
92. Hansen, supra note 84, at 630.
93. Id. at 632.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 644.
96. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 6, [1976] 2 Y.B. INT'L COMM'N 73, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add. 1.
97. Id.
98. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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thority to arrest.99 Therefore, when the bountyhunter abducts pursu-
ant to the authority given to him by the State, under the Draft
Articles the abduction is considered an act of the State for which it is
directly responsible. However, even if it is determined that the acts
of the bountyhunter are not directly attributable to the State, respon-
siblity may still be imputed vicariously.
B. Vicarious Responsibility Through State Encouragement
Vicarious responsibility is the responsibility which a State in-
currs for the acts of private individuals."° The State is responsible
for the acts of individuals which occur as a result of its complicity,"01
including acts of encouragement.'0 2 When a State encourages indi-
viduals to undertake illegal action it will be responsible for such
acts. ' 13 The United States engages in two types of encouragement
with respect to bountyhunting. The first form stems from the U.S.
system of bail. As noted above, the bondsman must post money to
insure that the accused returns to trial. If the accused flees the juris-
diction the bondsman is authorized to arrest the accused, return
them to the jurisdiction of the court and recover the bond.'" The
dynamics of the bail system offer a direct monetary encouragement
for the abduction of the bail jumper.
A second form of encouragement grows out of the United States
court's consistent refusal to divest itself of jurisdiction over the ab-
ducted defendant.'0 5 This jurisdictional policy stems from the Kir-
99. Id.
100. SVARLIEN, supra note 78, at 134. The term "private person," as used in this Com-
ment, refers to a person who is not a State agent and is not authorized by the State to carry out
the act in question. Private person is synonomous with unauthorized person in this Comment.
101. O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 279,
304 (1960).
102. C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (1928).
103. Ambramovsky-Eagle, US. Policy in Apprehending Alleged Offenders Abroad: Extra-
dition, Abduction, or Irregular Rendition?, 57 ORE. L. REV. 51 (1977).
104. See supra text accompanying note 86. This Comment will not seek to evaluate the bail
system in the United States. However, where the United States' system encourages illegal acts
this Comment does take the position that the United States is responsible and should remedy
these acts.
105. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 236 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1975); United
States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520 (2d. Cir. 1957). In these cases jurisdiction over the accused was
achieved through their abduction by State agents of the pursuing State. Thus, the abductions
were clear violations of international law. See supra text accompanying notes 21-77. However,
the courts held that such abductions did not impair jurisdiction. The holding was a declara-
tion that the State was not responsible for the acts of the agents. This jurisdicitonal policy,
which advocates no responsibility for patent illegality, is known as the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine.
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Frisbie doctrine, which provides that °6 the forcible and unlawful ab-
duction of a criminal defendant will not impair the court's jurisdic-
tion over that defendant. 0 7 The doctrine has been challenged, but
has rarely been rejected by the courts. 0 8 The continued vitality of
this doctrine effectively conveys the government's tacit approval of
abduction.
Additionally, direct encouragement exists when governmental
officials instruct private persons to kidnap fugitives. This type of ex-
press encouragement existed in the Jaffe incident."° Although it
may be arguable that a sufficient relationship exists between the State
and the bountyhunter to hold the State directly responsible, there is
little doubt that through monetary incentive, jurisdiction policies and
direct encouragement the United States incites abduction by
bountyhunters. At a minimum, a States' complicity should give rise
to vicarious responsiblity and the duty to repair the harm done.110
III. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR HOLDING THE STATE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTS OF BOUNTYHUNTERS
The practical reasons for invoking State responsibility for kid-
napping by bountyhunters focus on the effect abduction has on world
public order. State responsibility will create a deterrent to abduction
because it will induce States to take more effective measures to pre-
vent injurious acts in an effort to avoid sanction.
A. Same Injury Principle
The first reason for holding a State responsible for abductions by
bountyhunters stems from the type of injury that such abduction
causes. The injury that results from an abduction on foreign soil is
one to the sovereignty of the asylum State."1  This injury will be the
same whether committed by a State agent or a bountyhunter. Most
States, however, will only assume responsibility when the actor is its
106. Lawrence, supra note 54, at 1017.
107. Id.
108. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). This is one of the few cases
where it has been held that abduction negates valid jurisdiction. This holding imposes State
responsibility by forcing the State to remedy the situation. The remedy is divesture of jurisdic-
tion. See infra text accompanying note 152.
109. Florida prosecutors were quoted as saying, "why don't y'all go get him" in reference
to Jaffe who had taken asylum in Canada. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6. The evi-
dence supporting the fact that Florida prosecutors actually told the bail bond company to
abduct Jaffe consists of sworn testimony by a lawyer for the bail bond company.
110. A. HERSHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 162 (1912).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 21-35.
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agent. The same injury principle was recognized by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Villareal v. Hammond.1 2 In this case, the court
considered the extradition of a bountyhunter who had abducted a
person on Mexican soil and returned him to the United States to
stand trial for an alleged crime. The court held that the
bountyhunter had violated Mexico's sovereignty1 13 and found it in-
significant that the abductor was not a State agent. The Court recog-
nized that injury to the sovereignty of the asylum State occurs
regardless of the actor's status, and the country which benefits from
the injury causing acts should take responsibility to remedy the in-
jury. Accordingly, the court in Villareal ordered the bountyhunters
extradicted to Mexico to stand trial for kidnapping.
1 14
Another incident which highlights this point concerned the ab-
duction of an individual on United States soil by a British private
detective." 5 After the abduction the detective returned the individ-
ual to England."1 6 Although the abductor was a private individual
the United States complained to the British government.117 This re-
sponse demonstrated that the United States felt injury and held the
British government responsible even though the abductor was not an
official British agent. Great Britain also felt responsible because the
abducted individual was released and returned to the United
States. 118
A third example of the same injury theory is the Vincetti Af-
fair,"' in which U.S. agents abducted an individual in British terri-
tory without the authority of the United States government. 120 The
United States, however, released Vincentti, apologized to the British,
and stated that the agents had acted on their own initiative without
the knowledge or the approval of the government.1 2 ' Although the
abductors acted as private persons, the United States recognized the
injury and took remedial action.
These examples demonstrate that an abduction by persons from
foreign States is injurious to the sovereignty of the asylum State.
112. Villareal v. Hammond, 74 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1934).
113. Id. at 506.
114. Id. at 505-06.
115. Preuss, Settlement of the Jacob Kidnapping Case (Switzerland-Germany), 30 AM. J.
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This injury is the same whether the abduction is carried out by State
agents or private individuals. The asylum State will resent the intru-
sion and seek to hold the abducting State accountable. If the abduct-
ing State fails to take responsibility, relations between the two
countries will be injured.
B. Crime Causation
A second practical consideration for finding a State responsible
rests on the theory of crime causation.I22 This theory contends that a
State's failure to take responsibility for "private" abduction leads to
increased illegality throughout the world. If unauthorized abduction
carries no responsibility, a "State would merely have to allow its
agents to act as volunteers and avoid the whole problem." '123 This
type of loophole is particularly appealing when the asylum State re-
fuses to extradite a particularly heinious criminal. However, this
practice would also have the effect of legitimizing a form of interna-
tional kidnapping. Failure to find the State responsible for abduction
by bountyhunters creates an incentive for criminal activity, a contra-
diction that cannot exist among civilized nations. 24
C. Diluting Extradition Law
Transnational abduction as a means for returning alleged fugi-
tives undermines the legal process.125 The appropriate legal process
for apprehending criminals who have fled the jurisdiction is extradi-
tion.126 The United States, like most other common law countries,
will not return a fugitive in the absence of an extradition treaty.
1 27
Therefore, the United States cannot expect other countries to return
criminals when no treaty with the asylum State exists. It therefore
becomes vitally important for the United States to enter many trea-
ties and preserve their effectiveness if there is to be a systematic re-
turn of criminals. 
128
122. BASSIOUNI, supra note 64, at 143.
123. Id.
124. The premise that justice cannot be reached through the use of criminal acts is a corol-
lary to the principle that violations of law cannot ripen into lawful results. Id. at 144.
125. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. BASSIOUNI, supra note 64, at 10. By contrast, the civil law countries show greater
willingness to allow extradition in the absence of a treaty. In such circumstances, extradition is
allowed on the basis of comity. When extradition is executed through this form, the applicable
rules followed by the parties are those rules deriving from international law. Id. at 8.
128. Id. at 13.
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The extradition treaties commonly used today suffer from many
defects. 129 As a result, alternative methods for the return of
criminals become appealing.130 Failure to find State responsibility
only serves to enhance the appeal for an alternative method. How-
ever, by encouraging alternatives such as bountyhunting, States are
discouraged from using and developing the legal process of extradi-
tion. This practice creates the potential for the destruction of the ex-
tradition process and the replacement of that process with the illegal
method of kidnapping. 13  To demonstrate how the displacement of
the legal process may occur, it is useful to examine some of the de-
fects of extradition law.
1. Procedural Difficulties. One of the main problems with ex-
tradition treaties is excessive procedural requirements 32 that often
arise as a result of the municipal law of the requesting State.133 For
example, while some States require certain documents such as the
original warrant 34 or copies of the requesting State's penal laws,
others do not.' 35 There may also be differing interpretations of the
law allegedly violated.' 36 Finally, there are differing standards of
proof that the requesting State must meet before extradition is al-
lowed.'37 The requesting State must engage in a trial and error pro-
cess which can be lengthy and expensive.' 38  These procedural
difficulties were exemplified in the Jaffe case where extradition was
denied because prosecuting authorites failed to file proper forms and
also filed documents that were improperly drawn. 139 These proce-
dural difficulties were the factors that ultimately lead to Jaffe's
abduction. 'i0
2. Limited Number of Extraditable Offenses. The second ma-
jor problem with present extradition treaties is that they are often
129. T. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1971).
130. Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alternatives to Extra-
dition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25, 64 (1973).
131. Id. at 65.
132. SHEARER, supra note 129, at 2.
133. Id. at 208.
134. Id. at 132.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. VON GLAHN, supra note 31, at 253.
138. SHEARER, supra note 129, at 208.
139. See supra note 2.
140. SHEARER, supra note 129.
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limited to certain offenses.14 There are many serious crimes for
which the accused will not be extraditable.' 42 In many instances the
pursuing State must then use an alternative such as abduction143 to
reach justice.
3. Insufficient Number of Extradition Treaties. The final prob-
lem is a lack of a sufficient number of treaties.' As noted earlier,
many countries will not extradite in the absence of an extradition
treaty.145 When a treaty does not exist, the pursuing State will have
no choice but to use other means such as abduction to bring the crim-
inal to trial.
These problems demonstrate the present appeal of abduction
over extradition for returning a fugitive to the prosecuting State's
jurisdiction. If countries are not held responsible for the acts of
bountyhunters there will be even less incentive to use and develop the
extradition process. While extradition promotes the rule of law,
bountyhunting threatens world public order. One author has gone as
far as to say, "the most serious threat to world public order is the
unlawful seizure and abduction of an individual in a foreign
State."'" Such acts offend the asylum State because they are a trans-
gression against its sovereignty.' 47
The strain abduction places on peace is evident in the responses
of the offended governments in the Eichmann and Jaffe incidents. In
the Eichmann case, the Argentine government characterized Eich-
mann's abduction as "a violation of sovereignty that is incompatible
with the preservation of international peace."' 48  In the Jaffe inci-
dent, the Canadian government was infuriated by the abduction and
characterized the act as a violation of the United States- Canadian
extradition treaty. 1
49
These responses indicate that countries consider a violation of
141. Id. at 132.
142. Id.
143. "Disguised extradition" is the process where the asylum State places the person in
such a condition that he is likely to fall under the control of the pursuing State. See BAssIOUNi
supra note 64, at 133. The legality of this method is less questionable and a discussion is
beyond the scope of this article. Id. at 133. See also Bassiouni, supra note 130, at 67.
144. SHEARER, supra note 129, at 2.
145. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
146. Bassiouni, International Extradition in American Practice and World Public Order, 36
TENN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1968).
147. Id.
148. WHITEMAN, supra note 29, at 21.
149. Szende-Camper, supra note 3, at 58.
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their sovereignty as a threat to peace. Furthermore, disrespect for
sovereignty can lead to mutual disregard of international law,13 °
which only hinders efforts to maintain world public order. These
practical considerations demonstrate the serious consequences that
occur if States fail to take responsibility for the acts of
bountyhunters. Such failure will result in continuing injures to the
sovereignty of asylum States, increased international illegality and
the breakdown of the legal process for the return of criminals. For
these reasons, a solution that will insure State responsibility and
eliminate the need and desire for abduction must be found.
IV. PROPOSAL
The injuries caused by bountyhunting and the serious threat it
poses to world public order call for a remedy which offers complete
reparation. One remedy for an illegal act entailing State responsibil-
ity is to restore the status quo.151 Where abduction is concerned,
return to the status quo requires the restoration of sovereignty. The
remedy must entail the yielding of jurisdiction over the kidnapped
fugitive; only this will heal the breach of sovereignty.'52
To effect this remedy the courts must dismantle the Kir-Frisbie
doctrine which allows the maintenance of jurisdiction over the ab-
ducted defendant. 15 3 To compel the courts to withdraw jurisdiction,
a provision could be inserted in applicable treaties declaring that ju-
risdiction achieved through abduction is prohibited. The courts
would be prevented from assuming jurisdiction over the accused
since jurisdiction cannot be maintained in violation of a treaty.
5 4
Such provisions would discourage abduction by bountyhunters be-
cause if courts cannot assume jurisdiction the bountyhunter cannot
retrieve his bond. 1
55
A second remedy would entail the extradition of the abductors
to the offended State. This remedy would be easily implemented
since kidnapping is an extradictable crime under most extradition
treaties. 156  Extradition of the abductors would serve as an implicit
admission that such acts are unlawful and would reaffirm respect for
150. Garcia-Mora, supra note 10, at 441.
151. SVARLIEN, supra note 78, at 149.
152. Webb, Constitutional and International Law-International Kidnapping-Government
Illegality as a Challenge to Jurisdiction, 50 TUL. L. REV. 169, 177 (1975).
153. See supra note 105.
154. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
155. Hanson, supra note 84, at 598.
156. 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 773 (1965).
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the asylum State's sovereignty. This remedy has been used in the
past. For example, after the abduction of Jaffe the Canadian gov-
ernment requested extradition of the abductors. 158 In a show of good
faith the United States government granted extradition. 5 9 The prob-
lem with this remedy, however, is that it simply does not go far
enough. While it punishes the abductors, it does not restore the asy-
lum States' sovereignty because the abducting State maintains juris-
diction over the abductee.' 60
A final remedy which would diminish the desire for abduction
entails a restructuring of extradition law. Abduction is appealing be-
cause extradition treaties are procedurally complex, do not cover a
sufficient number of offenses, and are not entered into by enough
countries.' 6 One method by which these problems may be solved
would be through the creation of a Uniform Act on Extradition Pro-
cedure. 162  Under such legislation all States requesting extradition
would have to meet a single standard of proof before extradition
would be all6wed.' 63 The probable cause standard could be used as it
would assure the requesting State of the existence of sufficient evi-
dence that the accused committed the crime.
Such legislation could also utilize a single system of documenta-
tion. As illustrated by the Jaffe case, failure to execute the proper
documentation is a major snare in extradition law.' 6" The essential
documents of the uniform system would include the warrant, indict-
ment and prosecutor's deposition on the evidence against the ac-
cused. This system of documentation would be of great benefit since
it informs the requesting State of exactly what is required for extradi-
tion regardless of the differences between the two State's domestic
157. Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983).
158. For another case where this remedy has been used, see Villareal v. Hammond, 74 F.2d
503 (5th Cir. 1934).
159. Id. Sovereignty includes the exclusive right to jurisdiction over persons within the
State's boundaries. To restore sovereignty after an abduction, jurisdiction must be returned to
the asylum State by returning the accused. Extradition of the abductors cannot remedy this
situation for it does not restore sovereignty.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 21-62.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 132-45.
162. One of the major defects with extradition law is excessive procedural requirements.
SHEARER, supra note 129, at 2.
163. In many of the present treaties differing standards of proof are required for extradi-
tion. Blakesley, Extradition Between France and the United States: An Exercise in Comparative
and International Law, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 653, 665-66 (1980). Thus, a criminal may
be extraditable in one State but not in another for the same acts. This creates a procedural
problem which can lead to alternatives such as bountyhunting.
164. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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procedures. It benefits the asylum State in that these documents pro-
vide sufficient criteria to determine whether or not it is probable that
the accussed committed a crime and should be extradicted. Legisla-
tion of this type is advantageous and likely to be adopted because it
would greatly simplify the requirements for extradition and prove
less time consuming and expensive.165
A second step in the restructuring of extradition law would en-
tail the replacement of the older treaties containing limited lists of
extradictable offenses. The more modem treaties allow extradition in
all cases where the acts are punishable in both States.166 Implemen-
tation of the modem type treaties would eliminate the need for resort
to alternatives when an offense was left out when the treaty was en-
tered. Such a provision would also eliminate the cumbersome, ineffi-
cient and generally under-inclusive method of listing hundreds of
offenses.
The final step in the restructuring of extradition law is policy
oriented rather than mechanical. It would require all States, as a
matter of foreign relations, to exert a conscious effort to enter as
many extradition treaties as possible.1 67 This expansion would in-
crease the likelihood of an existing legal procedure for the return of
criminals. By developing the legal process in this fashion, the need
for the illegal process of abduction would be decreased.168
V. CONCLUSION
The abduction of an individual by agents of a foreign State is a
violation of international law because such acts violate the sover-
eignty of the asylum State,169 extradition treaties170 and human
rights. 171
Bountyhunters may be regarded as State agents whose acts con-
stitute State action 172 if there is a sufficient nexus between the State
and the bountyhunter 17 3 This nexus is expressly found in the form
165. Time consumption and expense are products of complex extradition laws which en-
hance the appeal for bountyhunting. See supra text accompanying notes 127-44.
166. SHEARER, supra note 129, at 134.
167. The limited number of extradition treaties between countries is another problem. Id.
at 2.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 21-57.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 63-70.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 71-80.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 81-95.
173. Id.
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of a contractual relationship,I74 or impliedly by virtue of the fact that
the bountyhunter performs a public function.175 Under either of
these theories the State is directly responsible for abductions carried
out by bountyhunters.I76
Even if the bountyhunter is considered a private party a State
may be vicariously liable for his abductions177 if the State encourages
his illegal acts. 7 " States presently encourage abduction by
bountyhunters through the bail system, jurisdictional policies and di-
rect coercion. 17 9 Thus on the basis of legal theory the State is respon-
sible for abductions executed by bountyhunters.
In additon to legal theory there are also practical considerations
for holding the State responsible for the acts of bountyhunters.1
8 0
These practical reasons focus on the fact that abduction is criminal
and injurious to other States.' 8 ' These characteristics are the same
regardless of whether the actor is a State agent or a private person.1
8 2
If States are held responsible for illegal acts regardless of the actor's
status, a deterrent to abduction will be created.'83 If States are not
held accountable for the acts of bountyhunters the erosion of the
legal process of extradition will ensue.' 84 The replacement of extra-
dition with abduction poses serious threats to world public order.' 85
The problems and dangers caused by international bountyhunt-
ing call for direct, prompt and effective action. Realigning jurisdic-
tional policies which encourage illegal acts and restructuring
extradition law so that it becomes a more simplified, inexpensive and




177. See supra text accompanying notes 81-110.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 111-50.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 21-62.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 111-21.
183. Responsibility entails the obligation to repair damages. See supra note 110. If the
State will be held responsible it will attempt to limit its liability by taking steps to prevent the
injurious acts.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 127-50.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 146-50.
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more effective legal process through extradition, the need for the ille-
gal process of bountyhunting will be diminished.
*Perry John Seaman
* I would like to dedicate this Comment to my parents without whose love and support
it would not have been possible.
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